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The Geographic Situation of the Kuril Islands 
 Since the turn of the seventeenth century, Russia and Japan have quarreled over the 
ownership of the Kuril Islands, or Northern Territories (Hasegawa, 1998, p. 8-9). As the author is 
a student of Russian studies, the Russian terms will be used more frequently throughout this work, 
although this does not reflect a bias of opinion regarding the legitimacy of either side. These 
islands, situated at either the “northern edge of the Japanese archipelago (“Northern Territories”) 
or the “southern edge of Russia’s Kuril Islands” (Yorgason, 2017, p. 205), are the bane of Russo-
Japanese relations (Hasegawa, 1992, p. 2), being the principle reason the two nations have failed 
to complete a peace treaty since the end of World War II (Hasegawa, 1998, p. 4; Zinberg, 1997, p. 
89). The dispute is also known as the Four Islands Dispute (Zinberg, 1998, p. 86) because the 
dispute is over the islands Kunashir (Kunashiri in Japan), Iturup (Etorofu in Japan), Shikotan, and 
the group of small islands collectively known as the Habomais (Hasegawa, 1998, p. 4).  
 
The Kuril Islands. (Australian National University, 2018) 
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 Situated in “close proximity” to Japan (Hasegawa, 1998, p. 5), the disputed islands are 
claimed by Russia as part of the Southern Kurils in the Sakhalin Oblast (Hasegawa, 1998, p. 5) 
and by Japan as part of the Hokkaido Prefecture (Okuyama, 2003, p. 42). While economically 
important for fishing, as the waters surrounding them are some of the world’s “richest fishing 
areas” (Hasegawa, 1998, p. 7), their true importance lies in their strategic value. These islands 
separate the Sea of Okhotsk and the Pacific Ocean, meaning that whichever nation controls these 
islands also controls economic and military activity between these waters (Hasegawa, 1998, p. 7-
8). 
 
 Historical borders. (Proehl, 2010) 
The Curve of the Conflict 
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From Peace to War: A Brief Exploration of the Conflict Until the Soviet Union’s Collapse 
 The conflict has experienced all stages of the curve of conflict in its history, although it has 
remained in stages of unstable and stable peace since the 1990s. Although early Russian explorers 
to the Kurils and the Japanese mainland were treated “amicably” by the Japanese (Hasegawa, 1998, 
p. 16), this began to change in the mid to late 1700s, when Catherine the Great began supervising 
Russian activity in the Kurils (Hasegawa, 1998, p.17-18). This stable peace was jeopardized until 
the Shimoda Treaty of 1855 established diplomatic relations and designated a border between 
Iturup and Urup (Hasegawa, 1998, p. 24). The Shimoda Treaty de-escalated tensions to a state of 
stable peace, the designated border remaining until the end of World War II. 
 The conflict escalated briefly to a crisis that culminated in the Russo-Japanese War of 
1904-1905 (Hasegawa, 1998, p. 29) to settle back into a stable peace in the post-war period until 
the conflict again escalated to war in World War II (Hasegawa, 1998, p. 30-31, 43). Promised the 
Kurils at the 1945 Yalta Conference (Hasegawa, 1998, p. 8), the Soviet Union annexed the islands 
immediately after the war (Hasegawa, 1998, p. 76-77). However, at the 1951 peace conference in 
San Francisco, the United States and El Salvador stipulated that the islands not be given to the 
Soviet Union, causing the Soviet Union to refuse to sign the treaty (Treaty of Peace with Japan, 
1951). Since that point, there has not been a peace treaty signed between the Soviet Union (now 
Russia) and Japan (Hasegawa, 1998, p. 4; Zinberg, 1997, p. 89). However, the two countries signed 
a Joint Declaration in 1956, in which the Soviet Union offered to cede Shikotan and the Habomai 
Islands to Japan – with the completion of a peace treaty as a prerequisite (Jung, Yoon, and Jeh, 
2015, p. 264).  
Towards a Durable Peace? Attempts at Settlement in the 1990s 
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 During and beyond the 1990s, the conflict between Russia and Japan over the Kuril Islands 
has fluctuated between unstable and stable peace, with unsuccessful attempts to create a durable 
peace. As the Soviet Union fell, relations between it and Japan seemed to be heading towards 
stable or even durable peace. For example, in April of 1991, President Mikhail Gorbachev and 
Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu held a summit (Song, 1992, p. 108) in which they created a visa-
free exchange program that would allow both Russian and Japanese citizens to visit the disputed 
islands (Zinberg, 1997, p. 89-90). The Joint Declaration signed by Gorbachev and Kaifu in 1991 
was monumental, as it was the first time the Soviet Union officially recognized that there even was 
a territorial disagreement (Song, 1992, p. 105). The following year, President Boris Yeltsin 
announced a “Five-Step Solution” toward resolving the dispute, beginning by withdrawing the 
Soviet military presence from the islands (Okuyama, 2003, p. 39). 
This stable peace was jeopardized in the same year by Governor Valentin Fyodorov of 
Sakhalin, who announced that he refused to support “any settlement that would end up with the 
loss of Russian territory” (Okuyama, 2003, p. 42). Fyodorov’s counterpart, Governor Takayuki 
Yokomichi of Hokkaido, on the other hand, was determined to implement the visa-free exchange 
program to “foster regional cooperation by practical methods” (Okuyama, 2003, p. 44). However, 
the 1993 Tokyo Declaration reaffirmed both states’ commitment to a peace treaty through 
resolution of the dispute (Zinberg, 1997, p. 90). At this summit, Japanese Prime Minister Morihiro 
Hosokawa encouraged the separation of political and economic issues to produce “an atmosphere 
of economic cooperation” (Okuyama, 2003, p. 41). At the regional level, the Economic 
Department of Sakhalin created a “general plan for socio-economic development” for the Kuril 
Islands based upon foreign investment, which in practice would mean Japanese investment 
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(Okuyama, 2003, p. 42-43). The early years of the Russian Federation were marked by mostly 
hopeful preludes towards a consistently stable peace. 
 However, relations between the two countries stagnated until 1996, when the Russian 
Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov visited Japan with the goals of expanding political and 
economic ties while coming to new agreements regarding the territorial dispute. Looking to a 
similar arrangement between the United Kingdom and Argentina over the Falkland Islands, 
Primakov officially suggested a plan of “joint development” of the islands (Zinberg, 1997, p. 90-
91). In the case of the Falkland, or Malvinas, Islands, the two governments established a special 
economic zone around the Patagonian shelf for “joint exploration and development” in order to 
improve bilateral relations (Dodds, 1998, p. 624). Nevertheless, the 1996 “Fundamental Principles 
of Russia’s Frontier Policies” linked the Russian frontier with the territory of the former USSR, 
pushing them back towards a more unstable peace (Zinberg, 1997, p. 91). The Gorbachev-Kaifu 
Summit was followed by the 1997 Krasnoyarsk Summit between President Boris Yeltsin and 
Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, at which the two leaders agreed to conclude a peace treaty by 
2000 (Zinberg, 1997, p. 89; Okuyama, 2003, p. 40). In 1998 came the Moscow Declaration, which 
furthered the notion of a Russo-Japanese “creative partnership” (Zinberg, 1998, p. 86), including 
plans for a “joint fishery complex” in the Kuril Islands (Okuyama, 2003, p. 41).  
The New Century and the Kuril Island Dispute 
 As the year 2000 neared, agreements over the Kuril Islands were still at a stalemate. 
Because of this, there were many offers of continuing to conclude the treaty while “deferring” a 
decision on the territorial dispute (Zinberg, 1998, p. 88). Alas, the 2000 deadline for a peace treaty 
came and went without any “radical changes” (Shapovalova, 2013, p. 243). However, relations 
between the two countries improved with the inauguration of President Vladimir Putin in 2000 
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(Shapovalova, 2013, p. 242). In the Irkutsk Statement of 2001, he and Japanese Prime Minister 
Yoshiro Mori confirmed that the proposed settlement under the Joint Declaration of 1956, under 
which Russia would cede Shikotan and the Habomais to Japan, was still on the table. The election 
of Junichiro Koizumi later that year, however, caused a shift to firmer policies (Shapovalova, 2013, 
p. 244), encouraging restricted economic engagement to “pressure” Russia (Burrett, 2014, p. 374). 
Japanese business interests in the following years forced Japan to back off in 2003 
(Shapovalova, 2013, p. 244; Burrett, 2014, p. 374). This shift coincided with Putin’s 
announcement of Russia’s energy sector as an “instrument” for public policy (Diesen, 2018, p. 
593). However, a 2006 comment by the Russian Foreign Ministry asserted that Japan’s claims to 
the islands “undermine the bases of the postwar arrangements” (Yorgason, 2017, p. 210). As this 
reflects adherence to the informal Yalta Agreement (Hasegawa, 1998, p. 8), rather than the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty (Treaty of Peace with Japan, 1951), this indicates a lack of commitment 
towards durable peace.  
Wavering Between Stable and Unstable Peace: Japan’s Volatility 
 The increase in economic interdependence was challenged as oil prices rose, improving 
living conditions in the underdeveloped Russian Far East. As the need for Japanese investment 
declined, so did discussion of the issue within Russia (Shapovalova, 2013, p. 244-245). In 
response, the Japanese government and media collaborated on a “massive” campaign to bring the 
issue into the international spotlight in 2009 and 2010 (Shapovalova, 2013, p. 245), not unlike a 
2012 campaign by the Argentinian government regarding the Falklands Island dispute with the 
United Kingdom (Pinkerton and Benwell, 2014, p. 12). Japan’s efforts were not successful, as 
Russia responded by treating the dispute as a non-issue – in 2009, its Foreign Ministry declared it 
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a “well-known fact” that the islands were passed to the Soviet Union “on legal grounds” following 
World War II (Shapovalova, 2013, p. 245), again ignoring the San Francisco Peace Treaty. 
 During this campaign, the Japanese government was brought under the leadership of Naoto 
Kan, beginning a “fresh spiral of tensions” (Shapovalova, 2013, p. 245) particularly after Russian 
President Dmitry Medvedev’s 2010 visit to Kunashir (Shapovalova, 2013, p. 246). Diplomatic 
relations between the two stagnated until tragedy struck Japan in 2011 in the form of an earthquake, 
tsunami, and accident at a nuclear power plant (Shapovalova, 2013, p. 246). A shift in relations 
from unstable peace to stable peace began with Vladimir Putin’s return to office in 2012, 
particularly as Shinzo Abe returned to office in the same year (Burrett, 2014, p. 360-361). Both 
leaders met in 2013 to announce the “resumption of negotiations” over the islands (Burrett, 2014, 
p. 361). The continued attempts by Putin and Abe to improve Russo-Japanese relations has not 
stopped since the 2014 Russian invasion of Crimea. In fact, Abe has kept his comments on the 
crisis “to a minimum” (Burrett, 2014, p. 361-362). 
Post-Crimea Relations: Stable Peace Under Fire 
 Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and subsequent shunning by the West marked an 
important point in the nation’s pivot towards Asia. This was coupled with an improvement of 
relations with Japan through increased economic integration (Diesen, 2018, p. 583). These 
apparent moves towards a durable peace have been interrupted, however, pushing the dispute back 
to an unstable peace and even towards crisis. In February 2017, the Russian defense minister 
announced plans to deploy “additional forces” to the Kuril Islands – soon after the government 
named five of the uninhabited islands in the chain (International Crisis Group, 2017). The media 
was utilized in a similar way in the late 2000s, after British companies began drilling for oil in the 
waters around the Falkland Islands. The Argentinian government under Cristina Fernández de 
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Kirchner broadcasted these actions in order to augment their significance in the eyes of 
Argentinians (Benwell and Dodds, 2011, p. 442). In the same way, the naming of the islands 
solidifies Russia’s claim to them and ties them to Russian nationalism. 
 Relations between Russia and the West have declined since the 2014 Crimean invasion, 
putting Prime Minister Abe in an “awkward position” as he tries to navigate both sets of relations 
(Brown, 2018, p. 2-3). This was particularly obvious with regards to Japan’s response to the 
(probably Kremlin-backed) poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal in 2018, as Japan’s name was 
noticeably absent from the list of twenty-eight countries who expelled diplomats during the 
ensuing international outrage (Brown, 2018, p. 2-3). 
2019: Resolution at Last? 
 Putin and Abe met on November 14, 2018 to discuss the issue anew (“In meeting with 
Putin…”, 2018). They declared that the Joint Declaration of 1956 would be the basis of all further 
talks (Reynolds and Kravchenko, 2018), under which Russia would cede Shikotan and the 
Habomais to Japan (Jung, Yoon, and Jeh, 2015, p. 264). Citing a “new level of cooperation” from 
this meeting, Abe stated that “this issue, which has existed for more than 70 years since the end of 
the war, will be solved by Putin and me, and not left for the next generation” (Reynolds and 
Kravchenko, 2018). 2018 concluded without further talks on the matter, although both designated 
that their foreign ministers meet to “oversee negotiations” for concluding the peace treaty (“Shinzo 
Abe and Vladimir Putin…”, 2018) 
However, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov presented a conflicting image after his 
January 14 meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Kono, stating that returning part of the 
territory to Japan is “not up for debate” (Aljazeera, 2019). Putin and Abe met again on January 22 
of this year to discuss the issue, sparking protests across Russia in cities such as Moscow, 
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Khabarovsk, Kaliningrad, and Sakhalinsk, capital of Sakhalin Island (RFE/RL’s Russian Service, 
2019). “Left-leaning” and nationalist groups spoke out against a possible Russian cession of 
Shikotan and the Habomais – one attendee, Igor Skurlatov, passionately stated, “Today we give 
away the Kurils, tomorrow we give away Crimea” (RFE/RL’s Russian Service, 2019). Public 
opinion polls show that two thirds of Russians do not want to return the Kurils to Japan (Trenin, 
2019), endangering Putin’s plans for peaceful resolution. 
An Analytical Framework of the Conflict 
Actors 
 The primary actors in the dispute over the Kuril Islands, or Northern Territories, are the 
governments of Japan, today under President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. 
Almost as influential are the governments of Sakhalin and Hokkaido, the regions closest to the 
islands in each competing state (Okuyama, 2003, p. 42), as well as the residents of those districts. 
Also central to the debate (but rarely discussed) are the original inhabitants of the islands, the Ainu, 
whose “way of life” was destroyed by Russian and Japanese explorers dating back to the eighteenth 
century (Mangi, 2002, p. 60). Finally, China, the United States, and other Western nations also 
have influence over events due to their relationships with the primary actors. As major allies of 
Russia and Japan, respectively, China and the United States would both like to see the dispute 
resolved in their ally’s favor (Trenin and Weber, 2012, p. 14; Diesen, 2018, p. 582). 
Root Causes 
 The conflict is driven by the absence of a Russo-Japanese peace treaty since the end of 
World War II (Hasegawa, 1998, p. 4), although there were serious efforts to do so in the 1990s 
(Zinberg, 1997, p. 89; Okuyama, 2003, p. 40). Russia has held de facto control of the islands since 
the Soviet Union claimed them at the conclusion of World War II (Hasegawa, 1998, p. 8) without 
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the approval of the international community (Treaty of Peace with Japan, 1951). The conflict has 
continued for so long because its resolution will force Russia to “give up more” and Japan to 
“receive less” than either side anticipates (Trenin and Weber, 2012, p. 8).  
Issues, Scope, and Stage 
 Since the Joint Declaration of 1956, the primary goal of Japanese foreign policy has been 
to conclude both the dispute and a peace treaty for the mutual benefit of both sides (Mangi, 2002, 
p. 59). Along with advancing Japan’s security in Asia (Trenin and Weber, 2012, p. 14) through 
political and security dialogue between the two countries, the augmentation of economic relations 
(Brown, 2018, p. 1-2) would assist Russia in developing its Far East (Wohns, 2013, p. 9). 
Additionally, resolution of the dispute would weaken Japan’s far-right movement, a thorn in the 
side of Japanese policy in recent years (Wohns, 2013, p. 9). Now over 70 years since Japan has 
held the islands, many Japanese have moderated their opinions on the issue. Japan would like the 
dispute to be resolved as soon as possible, even if it means only receiving sovereignty over 
Shikotan and the Habomais (Brown, 2018, p. 1; Mangi, 2002, p. 59). Although the conflict has 
wavered around stable peace, for the resolution of the dispute to be successful, the Kuril Islands 
must be purged of both Russian and Japanese military equipment (Trenin and Weber, 2012, p. 12). 
 There are three groups of people who are suffering substantially due to the ongoing dispute. 
The first is the Japanese who were displaced from their homes during the Soviet occupation of the 
islands 70 years ago (Wohns, 2013, p. 9), followed by those who live on the islands now, as the 
islands’ economies are very underdeveloped (Okuyama, 2003, p. 46; Wohns, 2013, p. 9). Finally, 
the Ainu, who live on the islands themselves and in the neighboring districts, suffer the same 
problems as the groups listed above while not being given an adequate stake in the debate 
(Kawashima, 2004, p. 21). 
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Power, Resources, and Relationships 
 As stated above, Russia has the capacity to bolster Japanese security in Asia (Trenin and 
Weber, 2012, p. 14), while Japan has the resources to enhance Russia’s underdeveloped eastern 
economy (Wohns, 2013, p. 9). Additionally, a Russo-Japanese alliance would boost both Japan’s 
and Russia’s defense positions in Asia, as well as the security of the region as a whole (Trenin and 
Weber, 2012, p. 9, 13-14). Russia feels threatened by the heavy American presence in the region 
– Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov goes so far as to cite Japan as dependent upon the 
United States (Aljazeera, 2019). Closer relations with Russia will allow Japan to become more 
autonomous from the United States. If the opposite happens, both sides will polarize further – 
Russia to China and Japan to the United States. This outcome is dangerous, considering that the 
“confrontation” between the United States and China is only mounting (Trenin, 2019). 
It is clear from Putin’s rhetoric over the course of his presidency, such as his interest in the 
energy sector in 2003 (Diesen, 2018, p. 593) and his ambitious plans to “boost Russia’s standing” 
in the World Bank (Trenin and Weber, 2012, p. 9), that he is interested in developing Russia’s 
economy. Not only would Japan expand markets for Russian goods, but their collaboration would 
transform the Russian economy into one that “thrives” on education and technology (Trenin and 
Weber, 2012, p. 9). Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Kono is adamant that solving the territorial 
dispute is a prerequisite for the expansion of “economic and other ties” (Aljazeera, 2019).  
 With the return of Putin and Abe in 2012 came a “marked improvement” in Russo-Japanese 
relations (Burrett, 2014, p. 360). Putin’s positive predisposition towards Japan (Brown, 2018, p. 
4), as well as Abe’s “new approach” to engaging Russia politically and economically, both suggest 
a strong relationship (Brown, 2018, p. 1). This is supported by the amount of dialogue held between 
the two, as their November 2018 meeting was their twenty-third while in office (Reynolds and 
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Kravchenko, 2018). With both leaders nearing the ends of their terms – Abe will leave office “no 
later than 2021,” while Putin will remain until 2024 – if an agreement is to be made, it must be 
made in 2019 (Trenin 2019). Even with the goodwill the two have fostered since 2012, it will take 
time to convince their constituents to support any deal they create. To provide enough time for 
ratification, the agreement needs to be solidified this year (Trenin, 2019). 
History of the Relationship 
 The parties coexisted peacefully during the Russo-Japanese Entente of 1906 to 1914 and 
their subsequent alliance of 1916 during World War I (Hasegawa, 1998, p. 30-32). There have 
been many previous attempts at settlement dating back to the Shimoda Treaty of 1855 (Hasegawa, 
1998, p. 26), which fell apart during the Russo-Japanese War that began in 1904 (Hasegawa, 1998, 
p. 29). Since World War II, there has been a long list of failed attempts at resolution, starting with 
the Joint Declaration of 1956. Although this remains the most feasible plan for settlement, its 
prerequisite requirement of a peace treaty has prevented its implementation (Jung, Yoon and Jeh, 
2015, p. 264). The main attempts since 1956 have been the Joint Declaration of 1991 (Song, 1992, 
p. 105), followed by Yeltsin’s Five-Step Solution in 1992 (Okuyama, 2003, p. 38-39); the 
Krasnoyarsk Summit of 1997 (Zinberg, 1997, p. 89), and the Moscow Declaration of 1998 
(Zinberg, 1998, p. 86). The clear pattern to these failures has been the absence of a peace treaty 
concluding World War II (Hasegawa, 1998, p. 4; Zinberg, 1997, p. 89). 
 
 Although the relations between Russia and Japan have improved substantially since the 
days of the Soviet Union, the longevity of the dispute means there is still a long way to go towards 
resolution. Recent events between Ukraine and Russia (BBC, November 26, 2018) have further 
complicated Russia’s relationship with the West (BBC, November 29, 2018), although both 
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leaders seem determined to conclude a peace treaty before their time in office ends. Not only will 
Putin and Abe need to agree on the terms of such a treaty, but these terms must be supported by 
their constituents. The protests that rocked cities across Russia earlier this year testify to the 
challenges that will need to be overcome before peace is achieved. 
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